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Abstract 
We provide a model of an extended warranty. In order to maximize profit, a 
producer always wants to sell with some type of warranty as opposed to selling with 
no warranty. The extended warranty is more likely to be provided as the consumer 
becomes more patient, as the producer becomes impatient, or if the likelihood of 
product failure does not increase too much in the extended period. Finally, we show 
that there is a separating equilibrium in which the high-quality producers sell with 
warranties and the low-quality producers sell without warranties, with the consumer 
purchasing from the high-quality producer. 
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I. Introduction 
Many products we purchase come with some type of a warranty. An extended 
warranty, which extends the coverage of the warranty originally designed by the 
producer, is also available by the producer or a third party. The cost impact of these 
warranties can be significant. A priori, it is unclear whether it is beneficial to the 
consumer or the producer to have an extended warranty. According to Consumer 
Reports (see Figure 1), extended warranties are never worthwhile and are a high-
price gamble (“Extended Warranties,” 2008; “Why You Don’t Need,” 2009). 
However, a warranty, similar to insurance, provides protection against bad outcomes 
and faulty manufacturing quality. Furthermore, the producer can use a warranty as a 
signal of the quality of the product. Hence, it may be that the extended warranty 
offered by the producer may very well be worthwhile, but the same may not be true 
when the extended warranty is provided by a third party.  
 
Figure 1. Consumer Reports Statement on Extended Warranties 
We develop a formal economics model to help understand what type of 
warranties are provided and consumed. We begin with the general model of 
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The benchmark of the best-case scenario for the consumer means that there is 
neither hidden information nor hidden action, a buyer can purchase insurance in any 
scale of units, and lastly, all the competition is among the producers. In this situation, 
we show that the consumer will always want to fully protect himself against a bad 
outcome (i.e., full insurance). Of course, warranties are not identical to insurance 
and we cannot say with certainty that the consumer will still want the warranty under 
the new price and warranty pair. For example, warranties do not deal with partial 
warranty, partial replacement, or partial payment as insurance can. The producer 
replaces the entire unit if it fails to function as promised. Furthermore, the price of 
the standard warranty is built into the price of the final good consumed by the 
consumer. Therefore, we transition our model to the warranty scenario, introducing 
the likelihood of success and failure of a product, the replacement cost, and a model 
for a standard warranty and an extended warranty. We find that the producer will 
always want to sell with the standard warranty compared to no warranty, because it 
generates a higher profit. Higher profit is generated by the fact that there is risk-
sharing between the consumer and the producer.  
The decision becomes complicated when the extended warranty is 
introduced. There are situations in which the producer chooses to sell with only the 
standard warranty or only the extended warranty. The producer is more likely to sell 
with the extended warranty as the consumer becomes more patient, the producer 
becomes impatient, or the likelihood of failure in the later period does not increase 
by too much.  
Finally, we extended the model to incorporate high-quality and low-quality 
producers. A warranty can be utilized to signal the quality of the product. We find 
that the high-quality producer will indeed sell with a warranty and will generate a 
positive profit. The low-quality producer will not want to mimic the high-quality seller 
and will not offer a warranty. Hence, a market separation occurs according to the 
quality of the product. The consumers are better off purchasing from the high-quality 
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that the consumer may be better off consuming partially (via split bid procurement, 
etc.) from both types of consumers in order to prevent the high-quality producer from 
becoming a monopoly. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. We first start with a brief discussion of 
warranties, some potential applications to the Department of Defense (DoD), and a 
short background on the Department of the Army’s management of warranty. In 
Section 2, we provide a literature review on warranty. In Section 3, we lay out the 
basic model and variables, and we provide our analysis in Section 4. Section 4 starts 
with an insurance scenario, and then we move on to a single-period warranty 
situation. We extend the model to two periods that have the possibility of extended 
warranties. In Section 4, we close by analyzing the situation of different quality of 
producers. Lastly, we conclude with a discussion of future research. 
A. Warranty and Insurance 
In business and legal transactions, a warranty is defined as “an assurance by 
one party to the other party that specific facts or conditions are true or will happen” 
(“Warranty,” n.d.). Therefore, a warranty can actually cover a much broader range of 
issues than simply the replacement of a malfunctioning good during the coverage 
period. In short, a warranty can be thought of as a promise to deliver a product, and 
this delivery can have quality, performance, time, and other aspects built into it. The 
intent of a warranty is to make good on the delivery of a product, and is factored into 
it ex ante or interim of production but not ex post of a sale. Therefore, the warranty is 
already factored into the final price of the good and the consumer does not pay an 
additional premium at the time of the sale. This means that the producer is 
effectively saying to the consumer, “We will sell you this product and this product will 
do this for this many years.” 
Insurance, on the other hand, is defined as “an equitable transfer of the risk of 
a loss, from one entity to another, in exchange for payment” (“Insurance,” n.d.). 
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share risk between the policy holder and the provider for the price of a premium. 
This promise can be agreed upon ex ante, interim, or ex post of a sale and 
production. Of course, the state that insurance is contingent on can cover all aspects 
of the promises made by a warranty. An insurance provider is essentially saying to 
the consumer, “If such and such happens, we will do this for you.” 
A standard warranty is built into the price of the good, while an extended 
warranty is an optional purchase. This optional purchase process can make an 
extended warranty’s incentive and intent a bit ambiguous. For example, a standard 
warranty may promise that an electronic good will work for one year. An extended 
warranty that covers the product for an additional year effectively claims that the 
electronic good will work for another year. However, buying an extended warranty 
does not change the quality of the electronic good itself. This is because an 
extended warranty transaction is ex post of production, and the deal is made at the 
end of the sale. Then the extended warranty simply becomes a risk-sharing 
mechanism between the consumer and the producer, and the producer is much 
more informed about the failure rate than the consumer. Therefore, an extended 
warranty cannot provide motivation or incentives to produce a higher-quality product. 
An extended warranty is more similar to restricted insurance.  
Another way to think about the difference between warranties and insurance 
is the following: A warranty deals with quality and function, while insurance deals 
with bad states of the world. A warranty could be seen as a subset of insurance. 
Insurance is used to deal with any bad outcome, such as rain damage, fire, and so 
forth. However, a warranty only deals with a product’s failure due to quality and 
function. For example, a laptop hard drive’s motor failure after a month of normal 
usage would be covered under a warranty. A consumer can also buy insurance that 
replaces the hard drive when the hard drive fails due to a faulty motor.  However, if 
the damage to the hard drive was caused by the laptop being dropped, then the 
damage would not be covered under the manufacturer’s warranty, whereas it could 
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stated or modeled as a bad state of the world. But not all bad states of the world can 
be modeled as product failures; therefore, the modeling of a warranty is studied as a 
subset of the insurance market.  
B. Potential Benefits of Extended Warranties to the DoD 
In this section, we discuss why warranty management may be important to 
the DoD and the potential issues that can be analyzed. Although we do not address, 
in this paper, all of the issues mentioned in this section, warranty management is 
indeed important and does deserve further investigation. Warranty management is a 
challenge that many of today’s supply chains must confront, especially the DoD. 
Warranties involve customers returning allegedly defective units to the supplier in 
return for a replacement unit or monetary credit. Warranties involve many complex 
interactions, such as probabilistic repairs, high demand rates, multiple sources of 
supply, and strict customer service constraints. Though it is an expensive and 
complex logistical operation, many organizations mismanage or ignore their 
warranty policies, resulting in inefficiencies throughout the supply chain and ill will 
among supply chain partners. 
Extended warranties, sometimes known as service contracts, negotiated 
warranties, or extended service contracts, may be offered or requested by the DoD 
when it is purchasing new items or negotiating new contracts. Extended warranties 
protect the DoD against breakage after the normal warranty period has expired. In 
the DoD, extended warranties can be especially important for repairable items. 
Product Quality Deficiency Reports (PQDRs) capture whether an item is under 
warranty or not, and also include the expiration of the warranty. Products still under 
warranty are treated differently than products out of warranty. 
Warranties can be considered a type of insurance that protects the DoD from 
manufacturing and material defects. The premiums of standard warranties are 
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be defective and covered under warranty, the DoD receives a replacement product 
(or sometimes a monetary credit) according to the contract. 
When a supplier and the DoD enter into a purchasing agreement, the 
warranty and extended warranty terms must be agreed upon in the negotiation 
phase of the acquisition process. Both parties must carefully consider the terms of 
the warranty portion of the contract, as many contracts can cover many years. The 
aspects of warranties that should be considered include (but are not limited to) the 
following: what constitutes a defect; what is agreed upon to be “standard usage” of 
the product (which defines the conditions under which an item is covered under 
warranty); what is the standard operating procedure for claiming a warranty; whether 
or not refurbished items can be supplied as warranty replacements; what timeline 
the supplier agrees to supply a replacement item; whether or not the DoD can 
request a monetary credit in lieu of a replacement; and what are the  monetary 
repercussions to either party’s failure to follow the agreed-upon contract. 
An extended warranty typically extends the amount of time after purchase 
that a product remains under warranty. However, it may also cover a wider breadth 
of product failures than a standard warranty. For example, some extended 
warranties cover accidental breakage or water damage. The DoD must pay an extra 
premium in order to receive coverage, and the timing and requirements of 
replacement may change from the standard warranty agreement. 
Suppliers are not the only entities that can offer extended warranties. Two 
other options exist. First, a third-party service provider may offer extended 
warranties to the DoD. Second, the DoD may choose to “self-insure” its purchases. 
This would entail budgeting money to cover repairs rather than paying the premium 
to suppliers or a third party to cover repairs outside of the standard warranty period. 
There are many reasons that the DoD would want to buy extended warranties 
on certain products. This could include the reduction of the depot-level and field-
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from defective parts, and protection against suppliers abandoning a product in favor 
of new technology. An extended warranty may be advantageous when using a 
product with a high probability of breakage or when the DoD is a heavy user of a 
particular product.  Also, a long-term contract may incentivize the DoD to enter into a 
long-term extended warranty contract. 
However, there are some negative aspects of extended warranties. The time 
and effort required to receive a replacement item or credit may be extensive and 
highly variable. This could force the DoD into holding more inventory than would 
otherwise be necessary to protect itself against this long and erratic lead time. Also, 
suppliers may scrutinize and falsely reject warranty claims, resulting again in long 
lead times and potential legal ramification (along with their associated costs).  
Furthermore, the premium charged by the extended warranty provider may be too 
high compared to the benefits gained from having this type of extra insurance. 
In this report, we do not yet focus on how to use warranties as a method of 
quality control for the product, how to provide incentives to the producer, and how 
the warranty system should be managed. There is no doubt that these are important 
issues that deserve further analysis. However, as a needed initial benchmark and to 
gather a basic understanding of warranties, we instead focus on the formal baseline 
modeling with room for strategic interactions. In turn, we focus on the conditions for 
which type of warranties should be provided (standard warranty, extended warranty, 
and no warranty), and how the consumers and the producers (both the low-quality 
and high-quality type) should respond to one another. These analyses are essential 
first steps in providing a benchmark and building a more rigorous, as well as 
general, model of an extended warranty in order to address the problems stated 
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C. U.S. Army’s Management of Warranty1 
Currently in the U.S. Army, the Army Materiel Command (AMC) does the 
warranty management with the use of a database on information collected by the 
acquisition organizations in procuring such item warranties.  The materiel developers 
identify the cost of the warranties and provide the contracting office with a cost 
benefit analysis of the warranties.  The contracting office then procures the 
requisition with the warranties if benefits exist and are within the scope of the 
Federal Acquisitions Regulations (FAR; 2012).  According to AR 700-139 
(Department of the Army, 2005), the executions of warranty claims actions (WCAs) 
are tied with the Army Maintenance Management System (TAMMS).  If one of the 
army systems fails and is under warranty, then the user will return the broken 
system to the MACOM for repair through TAMMS procedures.  The MACOM will 
address the WCA and repair the system under the assumption of reimbursement of 
services rendered against the contractors.  If the repairs are beyond the level of the 
MACOM, then the contractor will have to replace the system. 
The DoD guidelines on warranties state that the project managers use 
warranties as a method of quality control and incentives during the acquisition 
process. However, the data to verify how the quality control or incentives are 
provided are not easily accessible or centralized. The various Selected Acquisition 
Reports (SAR), such as the report for the JSTARS (2002), which has a program 
acquisition unit cost of $9,973 million; Tactical Tomahawk (1998); and the report for 
the B-1 CMUP-Computer Upgrade (1997), do not mention warranties. For small 
items, such as personal computers, the manufacturer’s standard warranties are 
accepted. However, we are unclear on how often these warranties are actually 
executed. 
                                            
1 This subsection is written with help by Major Vinh Nguyen from the U.S. Army’s Acquisition Corp. He 
is currently an MBA student at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) with an expected graduation 
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Interested readers for the U.S. Army’s warranty management may refer to the 
following references: Army Regulation (AR) 700-139, Army Warranty Program 
(Department of the Army, 2005); AR 70-1, Army Acquisition Policy (Department of 
the Army, 2011); DFARS subpart 246.7 (2012), Defense Federal Acquisition 
Regulation Supplement on Warranties; and FAR subpart 46.7 (2012), Federal 
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II. Academic Literature Review 
The academic literature on warranty analysis is growing, especially in the 
area of extended warranties. Some early research, such as Frees and Nam (1988); 
Blischke and Murthy (1994); Chen and Ross (1994); Mitra and Patankar (1997); 
Murthy, Iskandar, and Wilson (1995); and Nguyen and Murthy (1986), explored the 
cost aspects of warranty from the perspective of a manufacturer. Other researchers, 
such as Lassar, Folkes, Grewal, and Costley (1998); Cooper and Ross (1985); and 
Lutz and Padmanabhan (1995), looked at the structure and potential behavioral 
implications of warranties in the manufacturer–consumer relationship. DeCroix 
(1999) found a distinct relationship between warranty, quality, and prices; 
warranties, in this paper and in Balachander (2001), are seen as a signal for quality. 
Thomas and Rao (1999) and Murthy and Djamaludin (2002) performed excellent 
reviews of the early research on warranties in operations and production literature. 
Eventually, academic research began to focus on extended warranties and 
their implications. Kelley and Conant (1991) explored the extended warranty’s effect 
on consumers’ attitudes on risk and manufacturers’ perspectives revenue and 
service. Padmanabhan (1995) and Lutz and Padmanabhan (1998) found that 
different segments of the market, based on usage and valuation, respectively, make 
it optimal for a manufacturer to provide a menu of extended warranty contracts. 
Likewise, Mitra and Patankar (1997) found that extended warranties are 
advantageous for the manufacturers.  Lam and Lam (2001) explored the optimal 
actions of consumers, as well as manufacturers, when faced with extended 
warranties. 
Recent literature has focused on the design of extended warranty contracts, 
as in Jack and Murthy (2007); Hartman and Laksana (2009); Li, Mallik, and Chhajed 
(2012); and Heese (2011), as well as the reasons behind consumers choosing to 
buy extended warranties, as in Chen, Kalra, and Sun (2009) and Jiang and Zhang 
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in order to compensate for the standard warranty time period. Desai and 
Padmanabhan (2004) looked at warranty as a type of insurance for risk-averse 
customers. 
The literature discussed up to this point places a heavy emphasis on 
analyzing the failure rate or deriving the cost of a unit based on the type of failure 
(single versus multiple dimension, etc.) and failure rates. These types of modeling 
are excellent at providing the optimal price to charge given the quality (i.e., pre- to 
post-production, but before the product goes on sale), but the models do not deal 
with how other producers and consumers will best respond. Behavioral results, while 
extremely important and informative, may fall short when it comes to setting a 
benchmark for behaviors and expectations.  
Our contribution adds to the literature by formally modeling the warranty 
situation via economic theory and allowing for the strategic interaction between the 
consumers and the producers. We formalize our economic environment by 
generalizing the industrial organization literature (Shy, 1995). This form of modeling 
provides the benefit of showing how the consumers and different types of producers  
(high quality and low quality) should respond to one another and what type of 
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III. Model 
We first begin the model by defining the consumers and the producers. The 
consumer of the good, or the DoD in our model, labeled as D, is a von Neumann-
Morgenstern expected utility maximizer. The consumer values the good purchased 
at V  0. There are two types of producers of goods in the market: Sq  where 
q  h,l   for high-quality type and low-quality type sellers. The producers can be 
thought of as contractors who are providing goods to the DoD. High-type producers 
are more likely to produce a product of a higher quality as we will discuss further in 
this section.  
The sellers compete in a Bertrand setting, meaning that they compete over 
price rather than quantity, and are profit maximizers. There is only a single good 
being produced. This single good can be sold with x type of warranty. For our model, 
we focus on the following types of warranty: w= standard warranty, ew = extended 
warranty, and nw = no warranty. For simplicity, the extended warranty doubles the 
standard warranty. Therefore, even though there is only a single good, in effect, 
there are three potential goods being sold. We assume that if the product failure is 
covered by the warranty, the producer will provide the consumer with a new product.  
There are two potential states of the world: product failure and product 
success. We denote the cumulative distribution function of a good not needing a 
warranty service when it is produced with effort level e by a producer of type t, and 
warranty service of type w is F(e | Sq , x) , and F(e | Sh , x)  F(e | Sl , x) for all e. In other 
words, the probability of a product produced by a high-type seller not needing a 
warranty service first order stochastically dominates that of a low-type seller. For the 
scope of this paper, we project the effort levels to a single effort level, and the 
probability of not needing warranty service (success) for type q providing x warranty 
is 
q
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Therefore, in the most general scenario, the probability of success is denoted as  xq,t
. Probability of success in the second period is lower than the probability of success 
in the first period:  xq,1  
x
q,2 . Furthermore, we assume that the reliability or the 
product quality is exogenous of the warranty type and the probability of failure is 
independent:  xq,t  
y
q,u  for x  y . Future extension can be that the quality is 
endogenous. We will drop the superscripts or subscripts when not needed.  
The cost of producing the good for both producers is 0  c  
1
V , meaning the 
consumer’s expected value of the good is more than the cost of production. 
Otherwise, there is no reason for the market to exist. Furthermore, there is room for 
gains from trade in this model. The price charged for the product with warranty type 
x is px . 




 be the discount factors for 









The purpose of a warranty is to protect the consumer against failure of the 
product that is due to the producer. Insurance’s purpose is much more general; its 
purpose is to protect the consumer against any bad states of the world. Hence, 
insurance can be written to protect the consumer against failure of the product that is 
due to the producer, as well as failure due to nature (fire, earthquake) or the end-
user (misuse or careless use of the product). Furthermore, warranty is a discrete 
service while insurance can be continuous.  
Let us first consider the first-best case scenario—with flexibility, with perfect 
competition among sellers, and without any information asymmetry. The general 
insurance case with two possible states of the world (good and bad), the consumer’s 
utility function is  
                                
UD 
U(V  aV  I  bI ) in bad state




            (1)
 
where V  0  is the value of the product to the consumer, a  0,1  is the portion of 
value lost in the bad state, I is the insurance payout, and b  0,1  is the cost of 
insurance. The probability that the consumer is in a good state is (0,1) . Therefore, 
the consumer’s expected utility function is  
       EUD  UD (V  bI ) (1 )UD (V  aV  I  bI ).                           (2) 
The consumer’s optimization problem is to determine the optimal insurance 
level, I. The first order condition provides that  




UD (V  aV  I  bI )
I
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Now to work with the insurer’s optimization problem, we have to consider the 
insurer’s profit in a good state and a bad state of the world: 
    
Profit 
bI  I in bad state




 .                  (4)
 
Therefore, the insurer’s expected profit is E(Profit)  bI  (1 )(bI  I ). In a 
competitive market with information symmetry, the expected profit is zero; therefore, 
the unit price of insurance b equals the probability of a bad state: b  (1 ).  
Finally, putting the consumer and the insurer’s optimization problem together, 




UD (V  aV  I  bI )
I











 , and finally, the 
equilibrium condition is that 
UD (V  bI )
I

UD (V  aV  I  bI )
I
. Hence, with the usual 
assumption of an expected utility function, this equality holds when
V  bI V  aV  I  bI , which suggests a full insurance of I  aV . This brings us to 
our first important result.  
Proposition 1: Under the insurance setting with complete information and 
perfect competition among the insurance providers, the consumer would like to be 
fully insured against the bad state and consume exactly the same in both states of 
the world. 
Of course, this setting was the first best scenario, meaning, this is the best 
that the consumer can possibly do. We start by breaking down some of the 
assumptions in the first best scenario in the subsections to follow and determine 
whether a warranty is still desired by the consumer and the producer. Here are some 
technical reasons why warranty setting needs additional analysis. First, in warranty 
setting, we cannot partially insure the consumer and must replace the good whether 
it is a partial damage or full damage. Hence, I V . Furthermore, because it is not 
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consumer or not in another analysis). Third, a warranty can be used as a signal of 
the quality of a good. A producer insuring a good that is not related to the quality of 
the good does not help in terms of signaling the quality of the good. Lastly, the 
warranty is provided by the producer, and not a third-party insurance company.2
 
B. Complete Information: Single Producer Without Extended 
Warranty 
Next, we break down the insurance setting closer to the warranty setting and 
show that a warranty is still desirable for the consumer and the producer. Initially, we 
consider the case with complete information (just like the insurance case) by a single 
producer and a single consumer. The reason we start with a single producer is 
evident in the next section. If there is only one producer, the producer is a monopoly 
and will extract the entire surplus from the consumer. 
The potential surplus to extract from the consumer depends on whether the 
warranty is provided or not. The expected utility in both cases is  
EU 
U(V  pw ) Warranty




 .   (5) 
The producer then has to find the proper price to charge in each case for the 
expected utility to equal zero. First, for existence of solution in both cases: When a 
warranty is provided, because U (V , p) is a continuous, increasing function in V  and 
a decreasing function in p, we can always find a pw* such that U (V  pw*)  0 within 
an affine transformation.3 When the warranty is not provided, the producer charges 
                                            
2 While it is true that there are third-party extended warranty providers, this is outside the scope of 
this paper. 
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 . The solution for this equality, pnw* , also exists 
for the same reason as with the case in which a warranty is provided. 
The producer’s problem is as follows: Since the producer is a monopoly in 
this setting, the producer will compare the expected profit (expected profit = price – 
expected cost4) under both scenarios and take the best course of action. In short, 
the expected profit in both cases is 
Expected Profit 
pw*  c Warranty




 .             (6)
 Lemma 1: The producer will sell the good with a warranty if  p
w*  pnw*. 
Notice that, unlike the insurance case, there will be cases in which the seller 
provides no warranty. The producer will sell with the warranty if the price the 
producer can charge with a warranty multiplied by the probability (which is always 
less than 1) of a good state (product does not fail) is higher than the price the 
producer can charge without a warranty. So simply being able to charge more in a 
warranty situation is not enough to sell the product with a warranty. The benefit has 
to be high enough that, even when it is contracted by the probability of good event, it 
is still higher than the price the producer can charge without a warranty. Another way 
of thinking is that, as the good is less likely to fail (  increases), the producer is 
more likely to provide the good with a warranty, that is, either the price the producer 
can charge has to be very high or the quality of the product has to be very high.5  
                                            
4 Derivation for the cost is omitted. The warranty case follows the logic of geometric sum: 
c  (1 )c  (1 )2 c   c /  . 
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We illustrate our result using two examples: a linear utility function (risk-
neutral consumer who simply wants to maximize the value consumed) and a 
constant absolute risk-aversion utility function (risk-averse consumer). 
1. Example: Linear Utility Function 
Suppose the consumer has the following expected utility function:
U (V , p) V  p . This model of utility function is useful when we are looking to 
maximize the total value or dollar. Using the methods mentioned in section 4.2, we 
find that the optimal price to charge under the warranty and no-warranty scenario 
are as follows: pw* V  and pnw*  V . Because pw*  pnw* , as stated in Proposition 
2, the producer will always sell the good with a warranty. Here is an explanation of 
why this is the case. First, the consumer is indifferent between the two prices and 
the warranty pair with an expected utility of 0. Therefore, we only need to show that 
the profit of the producer is higher in the warranty setting than the no-warranty 
setting. The profit in the no-warranty setting is V  c , which is only a fraction (since 
 1) of the profit in the warranty setting of V  c /  . Hence, a warranty will always 
be provided in this risk-neutral scenario.6  
2. Example: Constant Absolute Risk-Aversion Utility Function 
Suppose the consumer has the following expected utility function: 
U (V , p)  1 exp( (V  p))  where   is the risk-aversion coefficient. This problem 
isn’t as trivial as the linear utility function example. The optimal price to charge in 
order to extract all the surplus when providing the good with a warranty is still 
pw* V , regardless of the level of risk aversion. The optimal price to charge when 
the warranty is not being provided is found by finding a price that satisfies
                                            
6 Of course, there is an implied assumption that profit is greater than zero. This is true as long as











1 exp(V  pnw*) . The closed form solution to the condition is 
pnw*   1  ln (1 ) exp(V ) . This solution states that, as the probability of 
failure decreases, the pnw*  will approach pw*, charging the consumer the exact value 
of the good. And as the good is more likely to become faulty, pnw*  will approach 0. 
Furthermore, as the value of the good increases, the price of the good, pnw* , also 
increases, but it is not in a linear fashion as it was in the previous example. Figure 2 
provides a graphical representation for an intution. Just as in the linear utility case, 
we find that the producer will always sell with a warranty and obtain a higher profit 
than without selling with a warranty. 
 
Figure 2. pnw*  Under Example 2.2.2: Constant Absolute Risk-Aversion Utility 
Function 
This graph (Figure 2) depicts the optimal price to charge under the no-
warranty setting given a risk-averse consumer. U (V , p)  1 exp( (V  p)) : 
calibration are V  10, risk aversion corresponding to the y-axis,   corresponding to 
the x-axis, and  p
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We conclude this section with this important result. The producers are 
providing a warranty, not because it is better for the consumer but because it 
maximizes their profit. The producers earn more profit by providing a warranty 
compared to not providing any warranty, because they capture the surplus of 
providing protection against the bad state (failure of the product). 
Proposition 2: With a risk-neutral and a risk-averse consumer, the producer 
always earns a higher profit by including a warranty. 
Proof: We begin by normalizing the expected utility to U (0)  0. The expected 
value being provided under the no-warranty case is V  pnw* . The certainty 
equivalent of obtaining the expected utility of zero under the no-warranty case is 
exactly when the consumer consumes zero. The expected utility function is concave 
for the risk-averse consumer. Then the expected value under the no-warranty case 
must be greater than zero. Then by Lemma 1, the producer will always sell the good 
with a warranty. 
C. Complete Information: Single Producer With Extended 
Warranty 
Allowing for an extended warranty requires another set of possible warranty–
price pairs. Furthermore, it requires us to extend the single-period model to a two-
period model. The expected utility of the consumer is given by 
EU 
U(V  pew )DU(V )




nw ) (11)U( p
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where the latter parts are the discounted expected utility in the second period. The 
expected profit of the producer is given by
 
    
Expected Profit 
pew*  c1












         (8)
 
Just as in the single warranty section, the producer has to determine the 
proper price in order to extract the entire surplus: EU  0 . 
1. Standard Warranty Versus Extended Warranty 
First, we determine the difference between a warranty and an extended 
warranty. The proper price to charge with an extended warranty pew*  is the solution 
to D  
U(V  p)
U(V )
. The proper price to charge with the standard warranty pw* is the 
solution to  2D  
U(V  p)
U(V )
 . We analyze this in the linear utility setting as before: 







) . The profit in each case is V (1D ) c1
 P c 2  c   and 
V (1D 2 ) c1
 for the extended warranty and the standard warranty, respectively. 
When the producer provides an extended warranty, the differences are positive. The 
difference in profit becomes  
V (1D ) c1
 P c 2  c  V (1D 2 ) c1   
                             





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 31 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
The difference in profit, 
Prof(ew-w)







. If so, the 
extended warranty will be sold and the producer will generate a higher profit 
compared to the standard warranty. On the flip side, if 
2
 is low, meaning it has a 
high probability of being faulty in the second period, then the extended warranty will 
not be provided and only the standard warranty will be provided. Holding the 
success rate  2  fixed, the discount factor also plays a role in determining whether 
the producer goes with the extended warranty plan or the standard warranty plan. If 
the discount factor is rather low (discount rate is high) for the producer, then the 
producer will be more forgiving of the lower success rate at Period 2. In short, a 
decrease in the discount factor for the producer ( P ), an increase in the success rate 
in Period 2 (
2
), or an increase in the discount factor for the consumer (
D
) all 
attribute to an increase in the likelihood of the extended warranty being provided. 
This result is summarized as Lemma 2 and Lemma 2.2. 
Lemma 2: When maximizing the total value (linear expected utility) and 
comparing the extended warranty plan and the standard warranty plan, the producer 
will provide the extended warranty if  DV   Pc /  2 . Otherwise, the producer will 
provide the standard warranty.  
Lemma 2.2: When maximizing the total value (linear expected utility) and 
comparing the extended warranty plan and the standard warranty plan, the likelihood 








2. Standard Warranty Versus No Warranty 
The steps taken to analyze the difference between the standard warranty 
scenario and the no-warranty scenario are similar to those described in the previous 
section, 4.2.1. Continuing with the linear expected utility function of simply 
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), generating a 
profit of V (1  D 2 ) c . The difference in profit can be simplified to
Prof(w-nw)  (11)V  (11)(c /1), which is always positive. The result is similar 
to the result in section 4.2 in that the producer will always choose to sell with a 
warranty compared to selling without a warranty. 
Lemma 3: When maximizing the total value (linear expected utility) and 
comparing the standard warranty plan to the no-warranty plan in the two-period 
setting, the producer will always sell with the standard warranty, independent of the 
discount factor.  
3. Extended Warranty Versus No Warranty 
Finally, we evaluate the difference between the extended warranty scenario 
and the no-warranty scenario. We only need to compare the situation in which
 DV   Pc /  2 . This is the case because if  DV   Pc /  2 , then we know from Lemma 
2 that the producer will choose to provide the extended warranty over the standard 
warranty, and by Lemma 3, that the producer always prefers to sell with a warranty 
as opposed to no warranty.   
The difference in profit for these two cases simplifies to 
Prof(ew-nw)  (11)(V  c /1) (1 2 )(DV  pc / 2 ) , and the producer will decide 
to sell with the extended warranty versus no warranty if the difference is positive. 
Unfortunately, because the first-period effect is positive and the second-period effect 
is negative, we cannot state definitely which of the two options the producer will 
choose for all ranges of value. If the expected profit from the first period is much 
higher than the expected discounted loss in the second period, the producer will 
choose to sell with an extended warranty compared to not selling with any warranty. 
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extended warranty and the no-warranty scenarios are dominated by the standard 
warranty scenario. Hence, it isn’t necessarily required to determine which of the two 
settings offer the higher profit.  
These analyses in section 4.3 provide us with the following main result.  
Proposition 3: Consider the case of the two-period model with its ability to 
provide no warranty, a standard warranty, and an extended warranty. If 
 DV   Pc /  2 , then the producer’s profit is the highest when providing a product with 
the extended warranty, second highest when providing the standard warranty, and 
the lowest when providing no warranty. Therefore, the producer will sell with an 






, then the producer’s profit is the highest 
when selling with the standard warranty, and the producer will not sell the extended 
warranty or opt for no warranty.  
Proof: Follows from Lemma 2, Lemma 3.  
In summary, this proposition states that the producer will always choose to 
sell with some type of warranty whether it is an extended warranty or a standard 
warranty. Deciding between the standard warranty and the extended warranty 
occurs on several factors as stated in Lemma 2.2. In particular, how much does the 
success rate of a product decrease when it transitions from Period 1 to Period 2. If 
this decrease is high, meaning the product has a short lifespan, the extended 
warranty will not be provided. In addition, the discount factor that the producer and 
the consumer place on second period’s consumption has an impact. The more 
patient the consumer is, or the less patient the producer is, the more likely it is that 
the extended warranty will be provided. 
 
D. Incomplete Information 
We started out with the complete information case with only one producer. 
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producer. We only focus on a single-period model with the standard warranty and no 
warranty for intuition. However, we introduce two different types of sellers: high 
quality and low quality.  
There are four possible situations we need to consider. In Case 1, both 
producer types produce without a warranty. In Case 2, both producer types produce 
with a warranty.  In Case 3, the low type produces with a warranty while the high 
type produces without. In Case 4, the high type produces with a warranty while the 
low type produces without.  
1. Case 1: Both Producer Types Without Warranty 
If both producers produce without a warranty, then there is no way for the 
consumer to distinguish the difference between the two types of producers. And 
because the producers are in a Bertrand competition, they compete over price until 
price equals marginal cost, c. Then the expected profit is pnw  c for both producers 
and ends with zero profit. The expected utility for the consumer is 
U (V  pnw ) (1 )U ( pnw )  where   ( l  h ) / 2 . The consumer retains the entire 
surplus in this market.  
2. Case 2: Both Producer Types With Warranty 
If both producers produce with warranties, the consumer still cannot 
distinguish between the two types of sellers. Again, because they are in a Bertrand 
competition, the two producers compete over price. However, the nash equilibrium in 
this case is different from Case 1. This is because it is cheaper for the high type to 
provide a warranty compared to the low type. The high-type producer can lower the 
price with a warranty to  for  small. If the low-type producer 
charges anything less than c /  l , the low-type producer obtains a negative profit. 
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low-type producer cannot mimic without losing profit. The high-type producer earns a 
strictly positive profit because . 
3. Case 3: High-Type Producer Without Warranty and Low Type With 
Warranty 
With this case, we check whether it is rationalizable for the high-type producer 
to produce without a warranty and for the low type to produce with a warranty. This 
is rationalizable if neither of the producers have an incentive to deviate from this 
strategy. If the high type is providing no warranty, then the lowest price that the 
producer can possibly charge is pnw  c , which provides a profit of zero. The lowest 
price the low type can charge is pw  c / 
l
 pnw , which also provides a profit of zero. 
However, we know from Case 2 that the high-type producer would mimic the low 
type and sell with a warranty to obtain a positive profit. Therefore, this strategy 
cannot be sustained in equilibrium.  
4. Case 4: High-Type Producer With Warranty and Low Type Without 
Warranty 
The final case in our analysis is the case of separating equilibrium, in which 
the high type produces with a warranty while the low type produces without a 
warranty (or exits the market in this case). The low type can charge a price ranging 
from  for  small,  which provides a profit ranging from [0, p
w  c]. 
The lowest price that the high-type producer can charge is  for 
 small and this provides a profit ranging from [0,c / l  c / h ] to c / l  c / h  0 
. Consider the extreme situation in which the low-type producer charges the lowest 
possible price and the high-type producer charges the highest possible price. 
Because lowering the high-type producer’s price will only decrease the profit, the 
producer has no incentive to deviate. The low-type producer cannot increase the 
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is a sustainable strategy by the producers, assuming that the consumer will choose 
to buy from the high-type producers over the low-type producers.  
We now compare the expected utility of the consumer to determine if the 
consumer will purchase from the high type with a warranty as opposed to the low 
type without a warranty. The expected utility with a warranty is 
U
D
(V  pw ) U
D
(V  c / 
l









( pnw )   lUD (V  c) (1 l )UD (c). The expected value 
that the consumer obtains without the warranty is given by  l (V  c) (1 l )(c), 
which is less than the expected value from consuming with warranty V  c /  l . 
Because the expected utility is a concave function, it must be that the utility of 
consuming V  c /  l  with certainty is higher than the expected utility of consuming 
 l (V  c) (1 l )(c) in expectation. This means that the consumer simply gets 
more value with certainty when purchasing the good with a warranty compared to 
the expected value obtained by purchasing the good without a warranty from the 
low-type consumer.  
Proposition 4: In the game of incomplete information, there is a separating 
equilibrium in which the high type sells with a warranty, and the low type is driven 
out of the market. 
Proof: Results from Cases 1 through 4. 
In short, the high-type producer will sell with a warranty and obtain a profit, 
the low-type seller will sell without a warranty and make no profit, and the consumer 
will purchase from the high-type producer with a warranty and obtain a positive 
utility. This result suggests that consuming partly from the low-quality producer 
instead of driving it out of business (collapsing the market to a single producer) may 
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generates a higher expected utility in the two producer cases compared to the single 
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V. Conclusion 
In this paper, we provide a formal model of an extended warranty. We find 
that the producer will always want to sell with some type of warranty compared to no 
warranty in order to maximize profit. The extended warranty is more likely to be 
provided as the consumer becomes more patient, the producer becomes impatient, 
or the likelihood of the product failure does not increase too much in the extended 
period. Finally, we show that there is a separating equilibrium in which the high-
quality producers will sell with a warranty and the low-quality producers will sell 
without a warranty, with the consumer purchasing from the high-quality producer. 
These results also suggest that the consumer, or the DoD, may want to consume 
partly from the low-quality producer (via split bid procurement, etc.) in order to keep 
the competition between the producers. If there is only a single producer, the 
producer is able to extract more value from the consumer and generate a higher 
profit. The consumer generates a higher value when there are two producers, 
compared to having only one producer, as in our analysis.  
There is much room for future research when it comes to allowing for 
strategic interactions with extended warranties. First, as stated in the modeling 
process, we can allow for the quality of the product to depend on the type of 
warranty selected and the amount of effort exerted to produce the product. This is a 
necessary step to understand how the consumer can use a warranty and an 
extended warranty as an incentive to motivate the producer.  
The producer can use extended warranties as a method of price 
discrimination. Producers can create a different type of warranty and price pair to 
target consumers with different risk and discount rates. This could be why we see 
both the extended warranty (at an additional cost) and the standard warranty being 
offered. The less risk-averse and impatient consumer will elect to consume with the 
standard warranty, while the more risk-averse and patient consumer will elect to go 
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market separation by the consumers. If there is only one type or a single consumer 
like the DoD, the model we have used is an appropriate setting. Then the natural 
extension is providing the DoD additional bargaining power. 
The timing of the creation of the warranty contract plays a significant role in 
determining the quality and the cost of the product. The warranty contract is written 
ex post of the product development in the current literature. However, especially for 
the DoD, the consumer may demand a particular good and warranty, and is in a 
position to make such a demand. Therefore, specifying a particular warranty contract 
ex ante of the product development affects not only the quality, but also the cost, of 
production. It is not clear whether extended warranties ought to be requested or how 
this change in the warranty contract timing will change the behavior of the consumer 
and the producer.  
If the cost of warranties, the quality of products, and the negotiation of 
warranty data were available from the DoD, we would be able to help the DoD 
become a better steward in warranty management. We hope to help the DoD 
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